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Abstract—Analytic tools are beginning to be largely employed,
given their ability to rank, e.g., the visibility of social media
users. Visibility that, in turns, can have a monetary value, since
social media popular people usually either anticipate or establish
trends that could impact the real world (at least, from a consumer
point of view). The above rationale has fostered the flourishing
of private companies providing statistical results for social media
analysis. These results have been accepted, and largely diffused,
by media without any apparent scrutiny, while Academia has
moderately focused its attention on this phenomenon.
In this paper, we provide evidence that analytic results
provided by field-flagship companies are questionable (at least).
In particular, we focus on Twitter and its “fake followers”. We
survey popular Twitter analytics that count the fake followers of
some target account. We perform a series of experiments aimed
at verifying the trustworthiness of their results. We compare the
results of such tools with a machine-learning classifier whose
methodology bases on scientific basis and on a sound sampling
scheme. The findings of this work call for a serious re-thinking of
the methodology currently used by companies providing analytic
results, whose present deliveries seem to lack on any reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Social network sites (SNSs) keep playing a primary role
in Internet users’ life: they are used to access news, to keep
in touch with friends, to share opinions and activities, to
play collaborative games, and much more [1]. Many online
tools investigate and aggregate the continuously produced
information of SNS’s users, and are also meant to increment
user participation and engagement. Similarly, there is a flour-
ishing availability of online tools as windows for data, news,
goods to commercialize, primarily suited to attract and/or
promote organizations and individuals: platforms to monitor
user interactions (like Facebook Insights, Woopra, PeerIndex,
Klout), integrated tools for simplifying and scheduling the
communication with different SNSs (like Buffer, HootSuite),
online software for customer relationship management (CRM)
(like Shoutlet, SproutSocial, Zoho), just to cite a few. The
typical online service for SNSs consists of an analytic engine
that collects and process data from the target SNS. The output
typically shows statistics on some parameter of the SNS
(e.g., the number of subscribers, a monthly (or weekly)-based
activity measurement of the network, etc.).
Nowadays, both traditional and online magazines and news-
papers leverage such statistics to shed light on fashionable
SNS’s subjects (like VIPs or brands). Media often propose
astonishing articles to their readers, aiming at starting gossip.
Unfortunately, statistics could be provided without any prov-
able guarantee of their reliability: they simply are supposed to
work properly, either because of the reputation of the developer
company or because media obtain remarkable revenues from
them. Thus, very often, reliability of provided statistics is
not considered as an issue, but just overlooked. One of the
goals of this paper is focusing on the trustworthiness of the
statistics offered by the SNSs analytic tools (from now on,
“SNSs analytics”), with an eye to the inner models such tools
rely on. As a running example, we concentrate on Twitter and
we explore those analytics that are periodically in the spotlight
for their impressive output: the count of Twitter fake followers.
Fake followers are Twitter accounts specifically created
to inflate the number of followers of a target account, in
order to increase its popularity and influence. As an example,
during the 2012 US election campaign, bloggers and Twitter
analysts noticed that the Twitter account of challenger Romney
experienced a sudden jump in the number of followers, the
great majority of them has been later claimed to be fake [2].
Since that date, the fake follower phenomena has grown more
and more and the mainstream media have advertised a lot of
analytics to spot Twitter fake followers ([3], [4], [5], [6]).
With a couple of clicks, the inquiring user can check the
last report on her preferred VIP, to see how many of his
followers are genuine, fake, or inactive. Problem is, in most
cases, the scientific methodology behind the statistics reports is
not available, the working principles are only sketched, and the
results of the analysis is just accompanied by some discursive
sentences listing high-level criteria that can help in discrim-
inating between fake followers and genuine accounts. This
approach is noticeably different from the scientific method
of investigation, in which, upon the problem identification
and the hypothesis for its solution, a series of observations,
experiments, and relevant data are exploited to test such
hypothesis, contextually providing other people with sound
evidence and reproducible experiments.
Besides the risks of relying on an unpublished methodology,
it is usually required to work via sampling, due to the huge
number of involved elements (e.g., Barack Obama has more
than 40 millions followers). However, this procedure can be
error-prone if the sample is inadequate or biased. Having in
mind the limitations that analytics may incur into, in this
paper we investigate to which extent the Twitter analytics for
detecting fake followers can be considered trustworthy. While
this issue has been already taken into consideration, e.g., [7],
such attempts represent isolated cases and, to date, there is
still a lack of scientific studies about the soundness of fake
followers detection mechanisms.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• we survey the most popular fake followers analytics,
freely available on the Web: namely, the “Fakers” app of
StatusPeople, the “Fake Follower Check” of Socialbakers,
and “Twitteraudit”. In particular, we report on their
methodology and approach, from the point of the user
of such tools;
• in order to analyse their scientific soundness, we go
further in analysing such Fake Followers analytics, by
performing a series of comparative experiments;
• finally, we compare the output of such tools with that of a
machine-learning classifier whose methodology bases on
scientific basis and on a sound sampling. Our experiments
will reveal the lack of reliability of the analytics under
investigation.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Next section
revises existing tools to spot Twitter fake followers and in-
active accounts. Section III briefly presents the “Fake Project”
fake follower classifier, designed and developed by the authors
of this paper. In Section IV, we perform some experimental
analysis, comparing the results of the considered tools. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, fake followers detection
on Twitter has not been considered by the academic litera-
ture. Many interesting work focused on spam detection, see,
e.g., [8], [9] or bot detection, see e.g., [10].
Instead, some social media companies have developed their
own applications to spot fake followers. In this section, we de-
tail three of the Twitter analytics that detect fake followers. The
results of those analytics have been worldwide advertised by
the Media, mainly highlighting the (supposed) high percentage
of fake followers of VIPs, from politicians to singers. The three
applications are: 1) the “Fakers” app by StatusPeople (referred
by, for example, the Huffington Post [6], the “Fake Follower
Check” by Socialbakers (mentioned, e.g., by the BBC [3] and
the New York Daily News [4]) and “Twitteraudit” (as reported
by, e.g., India Times [5]).
Apparently, the way these applications work is the same:
on the website hosting the application, a Twitter user inputs
the name of the Twitter account she wants to check. The
application, then, requests the user to authorize itself to use
her Twitter account and to access her profile, clearly listing
the kind of operations it could do after that such authorization
is granted. Finally, the application starts the analysis.
Considering the details provided by the official websites,
the analysis process appears also common to all the three
applications. Firstly, the application collects from the target
account a list of names, that are followers of the target account.
The number of collected names varies from application to
application and it usually depends on the total number of
followers of the target account. Secondly, the application
randomly extracts from this list a sample of follower names.
The size of the sample, again, varies from application to
application. Then, the application collects and analyzes the
information present on the Twitter profile of the sampled
accounts. The way such a collection and analysis take place
is the core of the application and its distinctive mark. Finally,
a report of the analysis is output to the user, showing the
percentage of fake followers that the application has detected
for the target account.
A. Statuspeople.com
StatusPeople is a UK company, founded in August, 2011
and providing “a Social Media Management and Reporting
Platform for business users”. Their tools are made to ease the
process of interaction of other companies with their customers,
mainly focusing on social platforms like Facebook and Twitter.
Fakers1 is one of their tools that keeps being repeatedly
mentioned by Media since its launch, dating July 2012. On
the official web page2 it is reported that, for an investigated
account, “a sample of your follower data, up to 1,000 records
depending on how ’popular’ you are” is collected and assessed
“against a number of simple spam criteria”. In particular, the
website notes that “on a very basic level spam accounts tend
to have few or no followers and few or no tweets. But in
contrast they tend to follow a lot of other accounts”. Seeking
for more details, we went through their blog. A post about the
first update provides some hints: depending on the number of
followers, the application collects up to 100K accounts and
assess 1K of them. However, since 97% of Twitter accounts
have less than 5K followers, the analysis of the application
should consider a sound sample of the effective population.
In a later post, dated 18 Oct 2012, after a modification to the
Twitter API, there is a new update of the application: from
1K records across a follower base of up to 100K, the assessed
records reduce to 700 across 35K. That one was the last post
disclosing details about their application. However, the post3
dating 26 Jul 2012 reports some concerns over the “Fakers”
app, raised by bloggers and newspaper commentaries, point-
ing out that such low numbers would not accurately reflect
accounts with a very large number of followers: for example,
if an account with 100K genuine followers buys 10K fake
followers, the application could show a 100% of fake, while
the right percentage should be around 9% (namely 10K over
a total of 110K). StatusPeople’s spokesman answered that,
for highly followed accounts, their application only provides
insights about the “current follower activity”, rather than a
projection over the whole follower base. But, still there are
no elements that clearly lists the features that a fake account
should exhibit. During an interview, Rob Waller, the founder
of StatusPeople, says that, among the several (unrevealed!)
1http://fakers.statuspeople.com/
2http://fakers.statuspeople.com/Fakers/FindOutMore/
3http://blog.statuspeople.com/Posts/Article/V/StatusPeople Fakers App
Shows People Care About Their Follower Quality/43
features they consider, the most meaningful one is the rela-
tionship between followers and friends of the account, i.e.,
“fake accounts tend to follow a lot of people but don’t have
many followers”4.
Then, in November 2013, the StatusPeople blog presents the
“Deep Dive” test, to provide more accurate scores for accounts
with the highest number of followers (like, e.g., Katy Perry and
Barack Obama): the Deep Dive samples the first 1.25 million
records, assessing 33K followers of such a sample. The tool
does not seem to be available to the users, but rather only
accessible to StatusPeople internals. A blog post of January
2014, in reply to a Forbes article, reported different results
with the Deep Dive tool, with respect to those obtained with
Fakers, for accounts with a large number of followers: Barack
Obama shifted from 70% fake to 45% fake, Lady Gaga from
71% to 39%, Shakira from 79% to 49%.
About the definition of an “active user” (that should be
adopted in contrast with the notion of “inactive”) Waller writes
in a post that the active user is “someone who is engaging with
the platform – producing and sharing content”, and thus, s(he)
is not simply someone who logs into the platform.
B. Socialbakers
Socialbakers is a social media analysis company, located in
the Czech Republic and born in 2008. Its aim is to provide
“solutions that allow brands to measure, compare, and contrast
the success of their social media campaigns with competitive
intelligence” . One of their free resources is the online tool
Fake Follower Check (BETA)5, launched in November 2012.
The website provides details6 about their methodology to
detect fake (or “empty”) followers. The rules have been
updated more than one time over our period of observation. To
date, when the following criteria are verified, than the account
is considered fake:
• following/follower ratio = 50:1 (or more);
• more than 30% of the account’s tweets use spam phrases
(like diet, make money, work from home);
• the same tweets are repeated more than three times, even
when posted to different accounts;
• more than 90% of the account’s tweets are retweets;
• more than 90% of the account’s tweets are links;
• the account has never tweeted;
• the account is more than two months old and still has a
default profile image;
• the user did not fill in neither bio nor location and, at the
same time, is following more than 100 accounts.
All the criteria have “a given number of points valuation” and
if their combination exceeds “a certain number of points”, the
account is considered suspicious. Those accounts marked as
suspicious are then tested against two more rules to verify
if they are “inactive”. One account is considered inactive by
Socialbakers if:
4http://neonfresh.com/status-people/
5http://www.socialbakers.com/twitter/fakefollowercheck
6http://www.socialbakers.com/twitter/fakefollowercheck/methodology
• the account has posted less than 3 tweets;
• the last tweet is more than 90 days old.
Accounts that are neither suspicious, nor inactive, are consid-
ered genuine. The tool can be used ten times a day, considering
“up to 2000 followers per account” and providing results with
a declared “small error margin of roughly 10-15%”.
No details are provided on how to weigh the satisfaction of
each single criterion and the threshold above which an account
is considered fake is not made explicit. Thus, we went through
the official blog looking for hints about those numbers, but we
were unable to find any further detail.
C. Twitteraudit.com
Twitteraudit.com hosts an application to check the percent-
age of fake followers of an account. According to the website,
it is online since 2012 and managed by the Twitter users
@davc and @grossnasty. Given each follower of an account,
the application computes a score based on i) the number of
its tweets, ii) the date of the last tweet, and iii) the ratio of
followers to friends, “taking a random sample of 5K Twitter
followers”. There are no details on how the score is computed.
In addition to the percentage of the resulting fake followers,
the audit also outputs three charts: the first chart describes how
Twitteraudit considers the checked account (fake, not sure,
real), the second one reports the “quality score” per follower
(with no explanation on what a “quality score” is) and the third
chart details the “real points” per follower, with a maximum
scale of 5. According to this output, we can argue that the
three criteria used to evaluate the score can sum up to five.
Twitteraudit.com makes also available a Fake Followers
Chrome extension that shows the fake follower percentage
when visiting the account page of a Twitter user.
D. Observations and remarks
As we have seen, the analytics under investigation do a
small sampling of the follower list of the target account and
do not clearly explain how they combine the adopted criteria
for the fake identification. What is more, the sampling is not
drawn uniformly at random, but it seems to be time-dependent.
That is, the followers taken into consideration are just the
latest ones to have joined—where “latest” differs from engine
to engine, but it is always a fixed number, unrelated to the
total number of followers. Here we want to stress how those
two elements can affect the results of the assessment.
Firstly, we recall some simple statistical notions for es-
timating the proportion p of a given population that holds
a given property [11]. The estimator pˆ = X/n, where X
is the number of samples positive to the property and n is
the size of the sample. Assuming i) a non biased sample,
ii) an independent choice of the samples and iii) a perfect
test of the property, the estimator can be approximated by a
normal distribution. We can evaluate its standard error σ with
the variance σ2 = pˆ∗(1−pˆ)n . Then, the confidence interval is
pˆ ± Zασ, where Zα is the critical value that depends on the
confidence level: with a confidence level of 0.95 Zα = 1.96,
while for 0.99 Zα = 2.58.
However, when the number of followers is larger than 10K,
our assessed analytics seem to have all the three assumptions
flawed. Firstly, the assumption i) is not satisfied, since the
sample is not unbiased: all the applications get the sample not
from the whole list of followers, but only from the ones that
started following the account more recently (this will be shown
in Section IV). Secondly, the assumption ii) not fulfilled either,
since the choice of the samples is not independent among the
followers: the applications compose the sample picking from
n followers (n varies between the applications), instead of N ,
that is the whole population. Such issues greatly impact on
the representativeness of the sample. And finally, regarding
assumption iii), the three companies provide no evidences
about the correctness of their fake detector engine.
III. THE FAKE PROJECT ENGINE
In a recent work [12], we have proposed a statistically
sound fake detection engine, with an open source classifier.
By contrast to the surveyed applications, our engine uses the
whole list of followers to perform the sampling and clearly
shows how to reproduce the detection engine. It considers as
“inactive” any follower that has never tweeted or whose last
tweet is older than 90 days. It considers “fake” followers those
accounts satisfying a series of properties, not reported here for
the sake of brevity, but fully presented in [12].
The fake classifier7 (FC from here on) has been de-
signed within the CNR’s “Fake Project”8, upon testing known
methodologies for bot and spam detection on a gold standard
of Twitter accounts, where fake followers, inactive, and gen-
uine accounts were a priori known. In particular, we have
applied to the accounts in our reference set algorithms based
on 1) single classification rules proposed by [13], [14], [15],
and 2) feature sets proposed in the literature by [8], [9].
The outcome of the analysis led us to conclude that fake
followers detection deserves specialized mechanisms: in par-
ticular, algorithms based on classification rules do not succeed
in detecting the fakes in our reference dataset, while better
results were achieved by relying on those features proposed by
Academia for spam accounts detection. Based on the features
and rules that best behave in detecting fake followers, we went
further by looking for an “optimized” classifier that considers
also the evaluation costs of such features and rules. Thus,
we have quantified their crawling cost and we built a set
of optimized classifiers that make use of the more efficient
features and rules, in terms both of crawling cost and fake
followers detection capability. The interested reader can find
all the details in [12].
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we report on two kind of experiments
we have performed. The first experiment aims at testing the
Twitter API used to gather data of Twitter accounts: our
hypothesis is that the API that requests the list of followers of
an account (hereafter, the target) reports the followers in the
7http://wafi.iit.cnr.it/fake/fake/app
8http://wafi.iit.cnr.it/theFakeProject/
API type elem.×request max requests×min.
GET followers/ids 5000 1
GET friends/ids 5000 1
GET users/lookup 100 12
GET statuses/user timeline 200 12
Table I: Twitter APIs: type and limitations to API calls. The
complete list at: https://dev.twitter.com/docs/rate-limiting/1.1
reverse order with respect to “following time”. This would
mean that the list of the first 1000 followers returned by
Twitter is actually the list of the last 1000 accounts that started
following the target.
The second experiment directly involves the Twitter analyt-
ics surveyed in Section II. We run them over a set of Twitter
accounts (with a different number of followers) and collect
statistics on the execution of the analysis, i.e., the results of the
analysis and how much time has been needed to produce them.
Based on the outcome of the experiment, we then discuss the
reliability and soundness of the analytics under investigation.
A. The testbed
We select Twitter accounts with a low (10K or less), average
(>20K and <100K), and high (>100K) number of followers.
In particular, for the average class of accounts, our aim is to
evaluate the response time of the analytics. For those classes,
we then choose accounts that would have unlikely been cached
for fake follower detection (i.e., accounts with a relevant
number of followers, but not belonging to worldwide popular
characters). Thus, for the average class, we identify the Twitter
accounts of thirteen individuals quite popular in Italy, with an
average number of followers of about 50K.
For the low class, we select the accounts of the analytics
developers, namely @davc and @grossnasty of Twitteraudit
(TA), @RobDWaller of StatusPeople (SP) and @janrezab12,
CEO of Socialbakers (SB), that have 10K of followers or less.
Finally, we select the accounts of three well-known politicians,
i.e., Obama, Cameron, and Hollande, as representatives of the
high class of accounts.
B. Twitter API analysis
Twitter has released a number of APIs that can be used by
developers to implement a set of various applications9. These
applications, with a set of permissions granted and the use of
the available APIs, automatically and quickly interact with a
target. In particular, the minimum set of APIs to run a fake
follower check on a target are GET followers/ids and GET
users/lookup. GET followers/ids fetches the list of followers
of the target while GET users/lookup gives access to the
account information of its followers. Other APIs are provided
to acquire more details about the target accounts, such as the
timelines (restricted however to the last 3200 tweets of an
account). To protect Twitter from abuse, the number of API
calls allowed per minute is limited. In Table I, we report the
9http://dev.twitter.com
seconds
Twitter profile followers FC TA SP SB
@giovanniallevi 13900 187 55 27 12
@StefanoBollani 22300 188 52 22 11
@Federugby 30300 193 40 31 13
@Zerolandia 33500 193 51 32 9
@pinucciotwit 35500 192 3 2 13
@mvbrambilla 36900 188 45 2 8
@PChiambretti 40500 198 45 23 9
@pierofassino 61500 203 52 3 10
@Lbarriales 69900 212 50 27 7
@PC Chiambretti 70900 214 43 31 9
@herbertballeri 72300 217 54 24 10
@Flaviaventosole 75400 210 49 27 9
@RudyZerbi 79700 216 49 26 10
Table II: Response time to first analysis request
maximum number of calls allowed per minute, which directly
impacts on the time needed to complete the data acquisition
process. This implies that collecting data of accounts with
a very large numbers of followers can be extremely time
consuming. For example, for our tests we gathered data from
the whole set of followers of President Obama. This required
a total time of around 27 days.
Our analysis is mainly based on GET followers/ids API,
used to fetch the target’s list of followers. We aim at verifying
that this API returns the followers of the target, starting
from the ones that became followers more recently. If so,
those analytics only fetching a subset of followers using the
above API, would actually consider only the newest followers,
leading to the analysis of a biased sample of followers (see
Section II-D).
To verify our thesis, for every account of our average
testbed, we saved the whole list of followers, together with
their position in the list, once per day. We then compared
the lists day by day, observing the positions in the lists of
the new users that started following our target accounts. We
verified that all the new entries in all the lists of followers
were always added at the end. This confirmed our thesis.
C. Fake Follower analysis response time
The response time to the first analysis request of the
thirteen Italian accounts under investigation is as in Table II
(we repeated the analysis several times). From the results, it
appears clear that some of the analytics have some results
already computed. The analysis response time of the Fake
Project engine (FC, cfr Section III) is always greater than
180 seconds: this is because, first, it requests the complete
list of followers and, then, it requests the profiles of the
sampled ones. Moreover, to be statistically sound, the sample
size is always 9604, to guarantee a confidence level of 95%,
with a confidence interval of 1%. Such response time is
consistent with the time needed to invoke the Twitter API for
the required number of times, given the limitations presented
in Table I. Twitteraudit (TA) is the only that explicitly reports
the assessment date: for example, the results of @pinucciotwit
were output after only 3 seconds since it was evaluated “7
months ago”. On the contrary, observing the response time of
StatusPeople (SP), it is evident when the results were cached:
while the average time was around 25 seconds, the reports of
three accounts (i.e., @pierofassino, @mvbrambilla, @pinuc-
ciotwit, two politicians and one opinionist, respectively) were
displayed after 2 seconds only (without mentioning if the
analysis had been performed in advance). Socialbakers (SB),
instead, does not seem to have performed any caching of the
results, since all the analysis took almost the same response
time. It is worth noticing that, for the subsequent requests
of analysis on the same accounts, all the tools output the
results in less than 5 seconds. Again, only TA reported the
last assessment time, while SB and SP do not explicitly say if
the analysis is real-time, or if the results have been cached.
D. Fake Follower analysis results
For the four applications under investigation (the three
Twitter analytics and the Fake Project engine FC), Table III
reports the number of inactive, fake, and genuine followers of
the targets. Overall, we may observe that there is a general
disagreement on such results. Excluding Twitteraudit, that
does not consider inactive followers, the Socialbakers Fake
Follower Check tends to recognize less inactive followers
than the FC classifier and StatusPeople Fakers. However,
there are examples for which the disagreement is high also
between FC and SP: for @mvbrambilla, @PC Chiambretti
and @RudyZerbi the inactive followers are, respectively, 75.7,
97 and 83.8 for FC and 42, 48 and 44 for StatusPeople.
Twitteraudit and Socialbakers results are similar for number
of genuine followers. Lastly, it seems that the more followers
a target has, the less the fake followers analytics agree.
We found an interesting issue regarding the following two
accounts: @PC Chiambretti and @PChiambretti. Apparently,
both belong to Piero Chiambretti, a well-known Italian co-
median and TV presenter. The first account was created on
December 2011 to advertise an upcoming TV show and has
tweeted only 13 times. On the contrary, the second account
was created on October 2012 and has tweeted 2500 times:
since its launch, the account continuously tweets personal
opinions of the comedian and posts his pictures. FC rec-
ognized that, on a sample of 9604 (taken from the whole
70900) @PC Chiambretti’s followers, 97% of them (9314) are
inactive. The analytics under investigation, instead, reported
much lower percentages: Twitteraudit only recognized 55%
of fakes, StatusPeople 48% inactive accounts and 44% fakes,
while Socialbakers 17% inactive accounts and 35% fakes.
Such values seem to confirm that the choice to select the
sample considering only the latest followers can lead to
inaccurate results.
Looking at the last three accounts in Table III, which have
the highest number of followers, we can see that the differ-
ences in results further increase. Twitteraudit, Socialbakers,
and FC assess the highest percentage of genuine followers
for Cameron, contrasting with StatusPeople, which only finds
35% of genuine followers. Overall, SP Fakers minimizes
Fake Classifier Twitteraudit∗ Statuspeople Socialbakers
Twitter profile followers inact. fake good fake good inact. fake good inact. fake good
@RobDWaller 929 25 1.4 73.6 7 93 28 0 72 0 0 100
@davc 2971 13.5 4.1 82.4 14 86 26 3 71 0 4 96
@grossnasty 3344 12.9 4 83.1 4 96 26 3 71 0 2 98
@janrezab 10800 18.4 2.2 79.4 11 89 27 3 70 2 2 96
@giovanniallevi 13900 44.3 9.9 45.8 34 66 58 18 24 5 27 68
@StefanoBollani 22300 27.8 12.8 59.4 29 71 49 11 40 12 11 77
@Federugby 30300 46.5 15.5 38 42 58 51 33 16 9 33 58
@Zerolandia 33500 69.2 7.3 23.5 63 37 55 35 10 24 25 51
@pinucciotwit 35500 30 6.3 63.7 28 72 25 13 62 7 15 78
@mvbrambilla 36900 75.7 6.5 17.8 47 53 42 30 28 9 34 57
@PChiambretti 40500 31.6 21.7 46.7 36 64 56 22 22 13 19 68
@pierofassino 61500 77.9 4.6 17.5 46 54 39 39 22 14 31 55
@Lbarriales 69900 49.5 20.6 29.9 48 52 57 32 11 13 21 66
@PC Chiambretti 70900 97 1.2 1.8 55 45 48 44 8 17 35 48
@herbertballeri 72300 46 10.4 43.6 48 52 56 22 22 14 20 66
@Flaviaventosole 75400 46.4 12.8 40.8 39 61 46 33 21 12 29 59
@RudyZerbi 79700 83.8 5.9 10.3 35 65 44 33 23 8 26 66
@David Cameron 595K 24 11.7 64.3 19.5 80.5 17 48 35 10 14 76
@fhollande 608K 63.6 5.3 31.1 64.3 35.7 35 44 21 44 14 42
@BarackObama 41M 57.1 8.5 34.4 51.2 48.8 40 41 19 43 12 45
Table III: Fake follower analysis results (∗twitteraudit does not consider inactive followers)
the number of genuine followers, compared to the number
reported by the other tools. SB and SP show substantially lower
percentages of inactive accounts than FC, over all the three
politicians. As in the case of @PC Chiambretti, this difference
can be explained considering that SB and SP only analyze a
small set of the newest followers and new followers are less
likely to be inactive than long-term followers. Therefore, a
sampling among the newest followers is likely to show lower
scores for inactive accounts than the scores computed from
a sample over all the followers. Overall results for Obama,
Cameron and Hollande seem to further confirm the doubts
about the low reliability of the evaluated closed-source tools.
We can conclude two main facts: firstly, we can confirm that
the choice to use a small sample of the last followers can lead
to very inaccurate results. Secondly, the general disagreement
confirms that the use of a closed-source fake detector engine,
that acts like a “black box”, produces results that cannot be
considered trustworthy. The adoption of criteria that are clearly
stated and open to discussion should be eventually preferred.
The Fake Project FC engine is based on publicly available
criteria and the training dataset is available on request.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we surveyed and analyzed three quite popular
Twitter analytics, counting the number of fake followers of
target accounts. We proved that these tools do not properly
fulfill the basic assumptions for an unbiased sampling. Also,
our experiments showed how the results of the tools, run
over the same set of target accounts, are generally misaligned,
leading to the suspect of scarce reliability. Such insights, other
than being interesting of their own, pave the way for further
investigation. Towards this direction, we propose the use of
more reliable tools, making use of proper statistical sampling
and with a disclosed methodology of analysis.
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